What is it to claim that “misogyny” might be “ironic”? Why is it that, in the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, the possibility of irony constantly interferes with a conclusive ethical judgement over the meaning of their “misogyny”? How do we hold our interpretations of such ambiguous texts ethically accountable?
This book brings together the driving concerns of hermeneutics, feminist philosophy and the history of philosophy in dealing with the “problem of irony”. It develops a thematic account of the concept of irony as a philosophical form of interpretation, and explores this through close readings of three key sites of controversy regarding the relationship between irony and misogyny: Schopenhauer’s “On Women”, Kierkegaard’s “In Vino Veritas” and Nietzsche’s “Woman and Child”. Far from a distraction from or “excuse” for misogyny, the book argues that ironic ambiguity is a formative aspect of all three texts; and explores the different ways in which the authority of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are constructed in terms of the problem of irony.
